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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-1012.5.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Does the failure of Petitioner Stephanie Boston (''Officer Boston5') to

properly marshal the evidence supporting the Salt Lake City Civil Service
Commission's ("CSC") factual findings preclude this Court from reviewing the
issues presented in her Brief of Petitioner ("Boston Brief')?
2.

Did the CSC abuse its discretion or exceed its authority when it

upheld Salt Lake City Police Department (USLCPD") Chief Chris Burbank's
("Chief Burbank") termination of Officer Boston based upon the two incidents at
issue viewed in light of the entirety of Officer Boston's employment history?
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

When an Appellant fails to marshal the evidence supporting factual

findings, the Court "must presume that the evidence presented was sufficient to
support the [CSC's] findings . . ." Wayment v. Howard, 144 P.3d 1147, 1151
(Utah App. 2006). "When a party fails to marshal the evidence, [the Court]
assume[s] the record supports the Commission's findings. [The Court has] shown
no reluctance to affirm when the petitioner has failed to meet i1s marshaling
burden." Whit ear v. Labor Comm '/?, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1998) see also
Hiiemiller v. Ogden Civil Service Comm V?, 101 P.3d 394, 397 (Utah App. 2004).

1

2.

The Court reviews the CSC's decision to determine if the decision

''exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Ogden City Corp. v.
Harmon, 116 P.3d 973, 976 (Utah App. 2005) quoting McKesson Corp. v. Labor
Comm X 41 P.3d 468 (Utah App. 2002).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5:
Any final action or order of the civil service commission may be appealed
to the Court of Appeals for review. The notice of appeal must be filed
within 30 days of the issuance of the final action or order of the civil
service commission. The review by Court of Appeals shall be on the record
of the civil service commission and shall be for the purpose of determining
if the civil service commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its
authority.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Officer Boston has appealed the CSC's decision to uphold Chief Burbank's
decision to terminate her employment. Respondent Salt Lake City Coiporation
("City") presented the CSC sufficient evidence that Officer Boston had violated
several City policies, that Officer Boston had an employment history containing
numerous negative aspects, that several similarly situated officers were treated in a
similar manner to Officer Boston, and that Officer Boston's repeated policy
violations despite significant training and discipline indicated that additional
progressive discipline would not be effective.
Based upon the City's evidence and after considering Officer Boston's
evidence and the positive aspects of her employment history, the CSC affirmed
Chief Burbank's decision. The CSC was correct in determining that (1) the
2

charges warranted the sanction of termination (R. 35, TJ8);1 (2) the Department
offered Officer Boston due process through the termination proceeding, (R. 35,
^}9); (3) Chief Burbank's choice of discipline was not unduly excessive or clearly
disproportionate to the offense (R. 35, If 10); and (4) Chief Burbank's choice of
discipline did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality (R. 35,

nil).
The Court should affirm the CSC's decision because Officer Boston failed
to marshal the evidence supporting the CSC's factual findings, attacking those
findings through conclusory statements and a selective presentation of certain facts
that only support her position. Also, because the CSC's decision was within the
bounds of its discretion, the Court should affirm the CSC's decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 22, 2008, the CSC upheld Chief Burbank's July 7, 2007
decision that Officer Boston violated SLCPD policies and that termination was the
appropriate discipline for those violations in light of her entire employment
history. Specifically, the CSC affirmed Chief Burbank's finding that Officer
Boston's actions in the October 6, 2006 and the February 16, 2007 incidents
warranted discipline. The CSC then affirmed Chief Burbank's conclusion that
1

The CSC's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R. 32-25) are fully
set forth in and attached to the Brief of Appellant, Appendix 2. [Pursuant to Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(b)(2), the City will rely on Officer Boston's
Appendix and will not submit R. 32-25 again but wall simply refer to the record
number throughout the City's Brief]
3

these two incidents, combined with Officer Boston's entire employment history,
including prior discipline as well as the positive aspects of Officer Boston's
employment history, warranted termination. In reaching its decision, the CSC
received extensive testimony and documentary evidence relating to each of the
two incidents and Officer Boston's entire employment history and heard testimony
regarding other instances of discipline at SLCPD.
Despite the substantial evidence supporting the CSC's findings, Officer
Boston claims the CSC failed to properly consider the evidence. However, in
order to attack the factual support for the CSC's decision, Officer Boston is
required to marshal the evidence. This requires her "to marshal all the facts used
to support the [CSC's] finding . . .." Wayment, 144 P.3d at 1150.2 Officer Boston
has failed to meet this requirement. Given Officer Boston's failure, the City will
properly marshal the facts supporting the CSC's decision. The Court should view
these facts "in the light most favorable to the [City]." Id. A review of the
properly marshaled facts demonstrates that there was ample evidence supporting
the CSC's factual findings.3

2

The Court has consistently required appellants to marshal the evidence when
attacking factual conclusions. The standard does not change based upon the body
making the factual findings. See, e.g., Grace Drilling Company v. Board of
Review of the Industrial Comm'/?, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).
3
The Record on Appeal consists of several multi-page volumes. Each volume was
consecutively numbered as if it were a single document. Consequently, the City
will cite to the specific page of a volume by referring to the Record number
assigned to the specific volume and then cite to the individually numbered page
within that volume. For example, the City's citation to (R. 31, p. 129) refers to
page 129 of Record number 31, "Reporter's Transcript of Appeal Hearing."
4

II. OFFICER BOSTON'S HISTORY
A. Written Reprimand
In July 2005, Officer Boston received a written reprimand, her first
discipline since being hired as a SLCPD police officer. (R. 31, p. 18; R. 18, pp.
920-921). Officer Boston was the initial officer on an assault call. (R. 18, p. 917).
During the investigation, information was developed that transitioned the case
from a simple assault to a domestic violence investigation. Id. Officer Boston
failed to follow SLCPD policy and arrest the predominant aggressor or both
subjects in the case. (Id.; R. 31, p. 15). Officer Boston, the secondary officer on
the scene and the 3-week recruit were advised that one of the subjects of the
investigation had approximately $14,000.00 in outstanding warrants and they
decided not to serve the warrants based on the fact that the subject had suffered a
laceration on his hand that required medical treatment prior to being booked in
jail. (R. 18, p. 917; R. 31, pp. 15-16). This decision was made without consulting
a supervisor. (R.31, p. 16).
Officer Boston received a Written Reprimand for violating two SLCPD
policies: D30-04-00.00 "Officers Use of Discretion" and D65-02-00.00
"Domestic Violence/Spouse Abuse Procedures, Section G." (R. 17, pp. 920-922;
R. 31. p, 18). During her pre-disciplinary hearing with then Captain Terry Fritz,
Officer Boston told him this was a "lesson learned." (R.31, p. 18). Officer Boston
did not exercise her appeal rights with respect to that written reprimand although
she could have done so. (R. 31, pp. 22 - 23; 303).
5

B. 40-hour Suspension:
On August 2, 2005, Chief Charles F. "Rick" Dinse ("Chief Dinse")
sustained three allegations of misconduct against Officer Boston based upon his
conclusion that she had violated three SLCPD policies in three separate incidents
that occurred in close proximity. (R. 18, pp. 669-672). The policies violated
included D43-03-00.00 "Reports - Submitting Reports - Time Requirements,"
D45-02-00.00 "Maintaining the Chain of Evidence," and D43-02-00.00 "Reports Accuracy and Thoroughness Required." (R. 18, pp. 670-672). Officer Boston
was aware of the policies she had violated. (R.31, pp. 38-39, 304; R. 18, pp. 781,
802). Officer Boston stated during her pre-disciplinary hearing: "I have learned
from all this. I mean, I do believe that since this happened my reports have been
better. I write more reports on things that maybe I would have questioned before,
documenting more stuff. This won't happen again." (R.31, p. 42; R. 18, p. 712).
In her predisciplinary hearing, Officer Boston again told Captain Terry Fritz that
when it comes to booking evidence and writing reports, this was a "lesson
learned" in that she had made a mistake and had learned her lesson from that. (R.
31, p. 40).
For the sustained violations of SLCPD policies, Chief Dinse imposed a 40hour suspension without pay. (R. 18, pp. 669-672). In the letter of discipline, he
wrote: "I sincerely hope that you understand the necessity of complying with
department policies. Be advised that any future sustained complaints may result in
discipline up to and including termination of your employment with Salt Lake City
6

Corporation." (R.31, p. 26; R. 18, p. 672). Officer Boston did not appeal her
suspension although she could have nor did she claim that she had been treated
unfairly. (R.31, pp. 304-305).
C. 80-hour Suspension
On October 25, 2005, Chief Dinse sustained two counts of misconduct
against Officer Boston for neglect of duty (one count for failing 1o write a police
report and one count for failing to book narcotic evidence) for an incident that
occurred on May 20, 2005. (R. 17, pp. 369-372). There, Officer Boston was
dispatched to a reckless driver call. Upon her arrival, she contacted a 15 year old
juvenile that showed visible signs of impairment and had possession of drug
paraphernalia and a small amount of marijuana in a baggie. (R. 31, p. 50). Officer
Boston detained the juvenile and transported him to a location where she released
him to his mother. Id. After concluding the contact with the juvenile's mother and
the juvenile, Officer Boston destroyed the marijuana pipe by breaking it and
throwing it in the trash without writing a police report on the incident. (R. 17, p.
369; R. 31, p. 52). Officer Boston contended that she had written a log report,
although that was inappropriate under the circumstances. (R.31, pp. 52-54).
During her predisciplinary hearing, Officer Boston admitted she had made
an error, stating: "With regard to this particular call 1 made a bad decision, a poor
judgment call. At the time 1 believed the log report was the right decision. The
situation was resolved without any arrests and I believed there would not be any
further problems. I believe documenting the action taken in a log report was
7

adequate. . . Today, looking back at the situation, I know better than that and
would definitely have done things differently. Unfortunately, 1 can't go back, I
can only leam from the mistake and move forward." (R.31, p.; R. 17, p. 416). She
also stated that if she had it to do over again, she "most certainly would have
booked the pipe into evidence and written a short report documenting my actions.
...It violated policy and I accept responsibility for that." (R. 31, pp. 59-60; R. 17,
p. 417).
Captain Fritz had felt that Officer Boston had been untruthful during her
interviews about the incident and had recommended to Chief Dinse that he also
sustain a violation of the "Truthfulness" policy. (R.31, p. 61). Chief Dinse chose
to give Officer Boston the benefit of the doubt on the truthfulness allegation and
did not sustain that. (R.31, p. 62).
Chief Dinse imposed an 80-hour suspension without pay for the violations
of SLCPD policies D43-04-00.00 "Reports - Situations Requiring a Report" and
D45-09-00.00 "Narcotics Placed in Evidence." Again, Chief Dinse warned
Officer Boston that "[a]ny further sustained findings of misconduct may result in
the further imposition of discipline, up to and including termination." (R. 17, p.
371). Officer Boston did not appeal the suspension although she could have nor
did she complain that she was treated unfairly. (R.31, p. 304).
III. INCIDENTS PRECIPITATING TERMINATION
A. The Collision/DUI Incident

8

It is interesting to note that although the incident that occurred in October
2006 was referred to throughout the CSC hearing as a DUI case (driving under the
influence), in Boston's Brief, she has chosen to refer to this as the "collision
incident." In an effort to link Officer Boston's new reference to the reference used
in the hearing documents and hearing transcript, the City will refer to this incident
as the "collision/DUl incident."
On October 6, 2006, Officer Boston was dispatched to a "Hit and Run Just
Occurred" call. (R.31, p. 104). Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Boston and
Officer Stutz, a very junior officer, found the vehicle and then contacted the
suspect at his residence. (R.31, p. 104). The suspect indicated to the officers that
he had been drinking at a bar and had crashed his car. Office Stutz testified during
his Internal Affairs (IA) interview that the suspect showed signs of intoxication.
(R.31, p. 104). The complainant who witnessed the hit and run had very specific
information that placed the male suspect behind the wheel of the car and indicated
that the suspect was intoxicated at the time. (R.31, p. 106). Officer Boston,
however, never made any attempt to contact the complainant. (R.31, p. 106).
Officer Boston was the scene commander but did not take control of the situation.
(R.31, p. 114). No field sobriety tests were conducted. (R.31, p. 106). The
investigation was incomplete and inaccurate. (R.31 at 108). A citation was
ultimately issued to the male suspect but it was not for DUI. (R.31, p. 107). The
citation inaccurately quoted the City ordinance. (R.31, p. 112). Officer Boston

9

failed to contact a supemsor and instead relied on the junior officer "freshly out of
the academy" to make a DU1 determination. (R.31, p. 114).
B. The Theft Incident
While the collision/DUI case was pending, another case alleging
misconduct by Officer Boston was filed arising out of a theft call to which Officer
Boston was dispatched. (R. 31, p. 123). A citizen had complained that his vehicle
had been burglarized and that some tools were taken from the vehicle. (R.31, p.
115). The victim believed that an individual in the apartment complex had taken
the tools and wanted Officer Boston to contact this person. R. 31, p. 115). Officer
Boston did not do that. (R.31, p. 298). She left the scene without writing a police
report. (R.31, pp. 115). She used a log report to state that a theft had occurred.
(R.31, p. 115-116). The victim contacted the Department the next day and another
officer was sent to the scene and investigated the matter. That officer wrote a
detailed report identifying the suspect and the tools that were taken. (R.3, p. 117).
This allowed an investigation to occur and the suspect was arrested in a relatively
short period of time. (R.31, p. 118).
IV. THE TERMINATION DECISION
Given the fact that Chief Burbank viewed the collision/DUI case and the
theft case as "very serious" because they "went right to our departmental integrity
and our organization's ability to take care of business and retain public trust,"
combined with Officer Boston's history, Chief Burbank felt he could not allow
Officer Boston to continue to work and, as a result, Officer Boston was placed on

10

paid administrative leave while the 1A investigations were pending. (R.31, p.
123).
Chief Burbank sustained the allegations of misconduct in the collision/DUI
incident because Officer Boston's conduct violated SLCPD policy D20-04-00.00
"Improper Use of Discretion and Failure to Take Proper Police Action." (R. 17, p.
204). Chief Burbank sustained the allegations of misconduct in the theft incident
because Officer Boston's neglect of duty violated SLCPD policies D43-04-00.00
"Reports - Situations Requiring a Report" and D44-04-02.00 "Call Classification
Criteria". (R. 17, pp. 226-207).
Prior to making his final disciplinary decision, Chief Burbank met with the
captain and the assistant chief who presented both cases to him and went through
the circumstances surrounding both incidents. (R. 31, p. 127). Chief Burbank
then reviewed both the underlying IA investigation files, Officer Boston's
responses in her IA interviews, the information she provided in her predisciphnary
hearing, her personnel history and information contained in her employment file.
(R. 3-4). Chief Burbank also granted Officer Boston's request to come and meet
with him and again present her side of the story. (R.31, pp. 127-128). She
admitted to Chief Burbank that she had made some mistakes in the two cases

4

Chief Burbank's letter of termination (R. 1-5) is fully set forth in and attached to
the Brief of Appellant, Appendix 1. [Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure Rule 24(b)(2), the City will rely on Officer Boston's appendix and will
not submit R. 1-5 again but will simply refer to the record number throughout the
City's Brief]
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(R.31, p. 128). When making his decision, Chief Burbank could not "outweigh
the good conduct with the problems that we had identified that had been
continually repeated." (R.31, p. 141). The Chief believed that Officer Boston had
been "afforded ample opportunity to change her behavior and did not do so."
(R.31, p. 144.). Chief Burbank stated, "Despite considerable training and
progressive discipline, you have shown a recurring lack of acceptable
performance, poor judgment, an inability to consistently perform basic
fundamental duties of a police officer and conform to Department policy." (R. 4).
Chief Burbank also knew Chief Dinse had warned Officer Boston that further
sustained complaints could lead to termination. (R. 4). Chief Burbank terminated
Officer Boston's employment on July 9, 2007, stating: "I have lost all trust and
confidence in your ability to meet the many demands that are placed on a police
officer." (R. 4).
V, PROPORTIONALITY
The CSC found that Chief Burbank's termination of Officer Boston was not
unduly excessive or clearly disproportionate to the offense. (R. 35, T|10). The CSC
heard testimony and received evidence on Officer Boston's background,
employment history, similar prior incidents, and prior progressive discipline. The
CSC made several findings relating to the matter of proportionality: 1) that Officer
Boston's overall service record was exemplary in many respects (R. 33, ^J 5); (2)
that Officer Boston was an excellent officer in many performance areas and at
various times during her employment (R. 33, ^[ 6); (3) that Officer Boston's
12

employee evaluations were universally excellent (R. 33, ^| 7); (4) that Officer
Boston received three disciplinary actions over a relatively short period of time (R.
33, ^ 10); (5) that by the time the two incidents occurred which precipitated
Boston's termination, she had been properly warned and was on notice that any
further misconduct on her part may result in termination (R. 34, f|| 12); (6) that the
series of violations were similar in nature and progressive discipline had been
ineffective (R. 34, ^j 13); and (7) that although Officer Boston did not willfully
violate Department policy, her actions evidenced a persistent lack of judgment
which caused the Department's management to lose trust in her as a police officer
(R. 34,114).
Officer Boston's personnel record includes many letters of commendation
for her service as a Police Officer and her performance evaluations contain many
"meets standards" or "exceeds standards" ratings. (See, Boston Brief, Appendix
3). Chief Burbank considered Officer Boston's commendatory service as a police
officer. (R. 31, pp. 128-129, 140).
In addition to these positive aspects of Officer Boston's career, the CSC
considered the negative aspects of her career. The CSC received evidence
concerning her three prior formal disciplinary matters and also received evidence
that Officer Boston's supervisors had informally counseled or warned her
regarding various SLCPD policies. (R.31,pp. 130-131). One of her sergeants
testified that Officer Boston "took shortcuts" (R.31, p. 236) and told her to make
sure "all your I's are dotted and your T's are crossed." (R.31, pp. 232, 238).
13

In his July 9, 2007 decision, Chief Burbank stated that he had "lost all trust
and confidence in [Boston's] ability to meet the many demands placed on a police
officer." (R. 4). Notwithstanding Officer Boston's considerable and lengthy
positive employment record, Chief Burbank concluded that Officer Boston's
termination was appropriate, in part, due to: the two incidents of misconduct (R.
4); the close proximity of two incidents; (R. 31, p. 140); the similarity between her
prior misconduct that resulted in formal discipline and the two incidents (R. 31,
pp. 140, 144; R. 4); the adverse affect of Officer Boston's actions on the public
confidence in the SLCPD (R. 31, p. 129-130, 134, 139); the adverse affect of
Officer Boston's actions on the morale and effectiveness of SLCPD employees (R.
31, p. 145); Chief Burbank's conclusion that Officer Boston was on sufficient
notice that her actions were unacceptable (R. 4; R.31, 130-131, 143-144); the
sufficient intervention and time for Officer Boston to correct her conduct (R. 31,
pp. 130-131, 143-144); Chief Burbank's opinion that Officer Boston could not
consistently perform the basic functions of a police officer and that the trend
would only continue (R. 4; R. 31, p. 143); Officer Boston's failure to learn from
her prior mistakes despite her repeated promises to do so (R.31, pp. 129-130); and
Chief Burbank's opinion that further discipline would not change Officer Boston's
conduct. (R, 4; R.31, p. 143). Further, the City presented many examples of
Officer Boston's inability to learn from her mistakes (R.31, pp. 18, 40, 42, 59-60,
128-130).

14

VI.

CONSISTENCY

The CSC reviewed Officer Boston's case against the evidence presented
regarding other police officers that had received discipline from Chief Burbank.
The CSC found there were several other similarly situated officers who were
treated in a similar manner to Officer Boston (R. 33, *\\ 4). Chief Burbank testified
of various individuals who he had disciplined during his tenure as Chief of Police.
(R.31,pp. 146-150):
a.

A sergeant who had no other complaints received $20.00 that was

found property but did not book that $20.00 into evidence. Because of this, Chief
Burbank "couldn't keep him as an employee." (R.31, p. 146).
b.

An officer who had been with the Department for 16 years had a

"similar stoiy of circumstances where he was not documenting his police actions."
(R.31, p. 147). Although he did "some outstanding work" and the Chief "really
hated to lose" him, "when it came down to it, he did not document accurately
domestic violence incidents, didn't file the proper paperwork associated with that,
and he really put the public at risk." (R.31, p. 147).
c.

Chief Burbank made the decision to terminate both of the above

individuals but both resigned in lieu of termination. (R.31, pp. 147-148).
d.

Chief Burbank testified of a sergeant who, on a DUI call, chose to

destroy evidence and not process the person for DUI. (R.31, p. 148). The
sergeant had no prior disciplinary history but Chief Burbank imposed a 60-hour
suspension without pay for this first sustained misconduct. (R.31 at 149-150).
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that the CSC improperly determined the evidence when it made its factual
findings. However, Officer Boston's failure to properly marshal the evidence
supporting the CSC's factual findings requires the Court to assume the evidence
supports those factual findings. Moreover, even if the Court re-examines the
evidence presented to the CSC, the City has demonstrated that the CSC heard and
received more than enough credible evidence to support its factual findings.
Chief Burbank's termination decision properly considered the severity of
the two incidents, Officer Boston's entire employment history, and the discipline
he had imposed on other employees. Based upon the evidence presented, the CSC
properly upheld Chief Burbank's decision to terminate Officer Boston.
ARGUMENT
I. OFFICER BOSTON FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTING THE CSC'S DECISION
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "a
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." This has been defined as a "critical requirement
of appellate advocacy." Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App. 12 If 24, 973 P.2d 431,
437. This Court has described the marshaling process:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the
client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
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despite the fact that on two occasions, her counsel admitted to the CSC that
Officer Boston was not challenging the underlying facts. At the prehearing
conference, Officer Boston's counsel contended that Officer Boston was arguing
that she had been denied her due process rights but was not challenging the
underlying incidents. At the beginning of the CSC hearing, Commissioner Jack
Quintana verified this in the following exchange:
COMMISSIONER QUINTANA: . . . Greg [Skordas], let me see if I
understand your comments at our prehearing. It is your contention that the
due process was the challenge here, correct?
GREG SKORDAS: Right.

COMMISSIONER QUINTANA: I take it Greg, you're not contending that
any of these things did or did not happen.
GREG SKORDAS: Well, that's true. We're going to talk about them and
howCOMMISSIONER QUINTANA: I understand that, relative to the
seriousness, et cetera.
GREG SKORDAS: Right.
(R.31, pp. 5-6). Officer Boston's counsel likewise did not challenge any of the
exhibits, which included the IA cases and her disciplinary history, from being
admitted at the onset of the hearing. (R.31, p. 6). It was entirely reasonable for
the CSC to take Officer Boston's counsel at his word and determine from the
19
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Court should decline to consider Officer Boston's challenge to the Commission's
findings and decision because of Officer Boston's complete failure to marshal the
evidence. See, e.g. Whhear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App.
1998) (the Court of Appeals has shown no reluctance to affirm when the petitioner
has failed to meet its marshaling burden).
II. THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS WERE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
A.

The substantial evidence standard.
It has been determined that the Commission's findings, upon which charges

are based, must be supported by substantial evidence. Lucas v. Murray City Civil
Service Commission, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah App. 1997). Substantial evidence
has been defined as "that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Id. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere "scintilla of evidence and something less than the
weight of the evidence." Id. The appellate court docs not review the
Commission's findings de novo or reweigh the evidence. Id. Findings based upon
substantial evidence will not be overturned "even if another conclusion from the
evidence is permissible." Whitear, 973 P.2d at 984, quoting, Hurley v. Bd. of Rev.
of Indus. Comm '/?, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 1988).
B. The facts supported the charges made by the Department and the facts
supported the discipline.
1. The coIIision/DUI incident
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c.

Officer Boston did not contact :1 :

d.

There were indications at tlic time that the suspect was intoxicated
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An incomplete and investigation was conducted. (R.31,p. 108. .
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1 heir wr. no «j uc -turn \\\\\\ ihc situation warranted a fin die1

investigation. (R.31, p. 110).
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h.

The steps that should have been taken include (1) conducting some

sort of field sobriety test, (2) asking questions of the suspect and witnesses, (3)
building the case, and (4) taking the person for an intoxilyzer test. (R.31, pp. 110111).
i.

Officer Boston was the scene commander and relied on a very junioi

officer to make a DUI determination. (R.31, p. 114).
j.

Officer Boston had been admonished before on other occasions that

if she had questions on how to handle things she should contact a supervisor but
she chose not to do that. (R.31, p. 114).
k.

Officer Boston failed to perform the basic fundamental duties of a

police officer on this call. (R. 1).
1.

Officer Boston failed to properly handle the call. (R. 1). -

m.

Officer Boston testified that she was trained to do DUIs. (R.31, p.

n.

She was trained to recognize the signs of intoxication and to

267).

administer field sobriety tests. (R.31, p. 267).
o.

Officer Boston has performed field sobriety tests on people when

she was employed wilh the County and also as a Salt Lake City police officer.
(R.31, pp. 268-269).
p.

Officer Boston was certified to administer the intoxilyzer test.

(R.31, p. 269).
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Although Officer Boston's counsel could ha\e cross-examined Chief Burbank oi\
this very issue at the CSC hearing, he did not. nor did he ever ask Chief Burbank
anything about Officer Stiitz, instead bringing this idea up for the first time in tin-.
appeal.
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impairment and Officer Stutz stated that the suspect was visibly intoxicated does
not create a material fact.
The CSC was in the best position to consider all of the testimony presented
related to this incident and reach the factual conclusions it did. It heard the
testimony, reviewed the evidence and made the credibility determinations
necessary to reach its factual conclusions. This Court has held that:
We note that trial courts are accorded wide latitude in determining factual
matters. They are in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses
and to gain a sense of the proceeding as a whole. Where contradictory
evidence is offered— the fact finder is free to weigh the conflicting
evidence presented and to draw its own conclusions.
State, ex rel Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Six Mile Ranch Company,
132 P.3d 687, 694 (Utah App. 2006). Further:
[T]his Court will not substitute its judgment as between two reasonably
conflicting views, even though we may have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before us for de novo review. It is the province of the
[CSC], not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for the
[CSC] to draw the inferences.
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 68.
Officer Boston's and Officer Stutz's observations were simply two pieces
of evidence that were before the CSC. To suggest that this discrepancy is
sufficient to outweigh the remaining evidence that was presented concerning the
collision/DUI incident and constitutes clear error on the part of the CSC to
determine that the facts support discipline is simply not plausible.
2. The theft incident
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first time in this appeal.
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d.

Any time an officer takes police action, he or she writes a report

detailing what action was taken, including a little narrative telling the story of
what took place. (R.31, p. 52).
e.

There were numerous times when sergeants had taken Officer

Boston aside and addressed issues such as writing a police report. (R.31, p. 130).
Even if the Court were to assume that Officer Boston adequately marshaled
the evidence, the Court should still affirm the CSC's factual findings because
Officer Boston has not demonstrated "that this evidence is 'legally insufficient to
support the finding[s] even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court
below.'" Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 561 (Utah App. 2003) quotingProMax
Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997). Officer Boston has
simply failed to adequately present any reason why this Court should disregard the
CSC's factual findings and the Court should assume they are correct. This Court
has repeatedly held that a party cannot "simply present the evidence supporting
[her] position at trial and reargue its weight. That approach misapprehends the
role of this court." Six Mile Ranch Company, 132 P.3d at 693-94. Again, the
Court need not consider Officer Boston's argument given her failure to properly
marshal the facts supporting the CSC's factual findings. Wayment, 144 P.3d at
1150.
Officer Boston's failure to properly marshal the evidence supporting the
CSC's factual findings is fatal to her claim that the facts do not support the CSC's
conclusions.
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within its discretion when it determined that Officer Boston's misconduct
warranted the sanction of termination.
A.

The CSC Properly Applied the Law.
The CSC properly held that the facts supported the charges made by the

Department and that the sanction of termination was appropriate. (R. 34, ^

1-2).

To reach this determination, it necessarily examined two questions: 1) is the
sanction of termination proportionate to the insubordination and other charges
against Officer Boston, and 2) whether the sanction of termination is consistent
with similar discipline imposed by Chief Burbank on other SLCPD employees.
This is the process set forth in Utah law. Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney,
818 P.2d 23, 32 (Utah App. 1991); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake City Civil
Service Comm 'n, 908 P.2d 871, 876-77 (Utah App. 1995); Harmon, 116 P.3d at
977,
B. The Discipline Was Proportionate
While this Court has not adopted one standard which the CSC must use in
making these determinations, it has pointed to several factors which other courts
have used to determine the "proportionality of the punishment to the offense."
Harmon, 116 P.3d at 978. The Court has also noted that a "series of violations
accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive discipline may support
termination." Id. The factors this Court sees as useful are:
(a) whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official duties
and significantly impedes his or her ability to carry out those duties; (b)
whether the offense was of a type that adversely affects the public
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confidence in the department; (c) whether the offense undermines the
morale and effectiveness of the department; or (d) vvhether the offense was
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duties because "no such explanation can be imagined, much less supported."
(Boston Brief p. 22). Again, Officer Boston simply ignores the evidence that was
presented to the CSC that shows that her ability to perform her duties was
significantly impeded:
a.

The collision/DUI and the theft incidents were "very serious" and

went "right to [the] departmental integrity and [the] organization's ability to take
care of business and retain public trust." (R.31, p. 123)
b.

Because of the serious nature of the two incidents and Officer

Boston's history, Chief Burbank could not allow Officer Boston to continue to
work "on the chance that there may be other case [sic] out there that she would
become involved in and mishandle" so he placed her on paid administrative leave
pending the outcome of the IA investigations. (R.31, p. 123).
c.

Chief Burbank determined that Officer Boston had shown "a

recurring lack of acceptable performance, poor judgment, an inability to
consistently perform basic fundamental duties and conform to department
policies." (R. 4).
d.

The collision/DUI and theft incidents, when coupled with Officer

Boston's prior history "reflected a pattern of continued inability to perform the
basic functions of a police officer." (Id.)
The CSC had ample evidence to conclude as it did that "[t]he violations of
policy which resulted in Boston's termination related directly to her official duties
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and significantly impeded her ability to carry out those duties." (R. 34, ^f 4). The
first Harmon factor was satisfied.
2. Harmon factor (b): whether the offense was of a type that adversely
affects the public confidence in the department
The CSC also determined that "[t]he nature of the policy violations
adversely affected the public confidence in the Department." (R. 34, ^| 5). This
satisfies factor (b) set forth in Harmon. Officer Boston states that no evidence was
presented that "the public at large has ever learned of Officer Boston's alleged
policy violations." (Boston Brief, p. 23)(Emphasis added). Contrary to Officer
Boston's assertion, there was evidence that the public was adversely affected. In
particular, Chief Burbank testified that the victim in the theft case, Mr. Baker, told
the IA investigators that he would participate in the investigation "as long as
Officer Boston doesn't come back. I don't want to see Officer Boston again." Mr.
Baker said this many times. (R.31, pp. 117, 122). This very unhappy citizen
clearly knew of Officer Boston's misconduct. There also was plenty of evidence
that Officer Boston's conduct was of the type that could reasonably affect the
public confidence in the Department. Chief Burbank testified:
When we go out there our mission is to actually serve the public and
meet their needs. And when we show up and do not conduct a thorough
investigation and leave things hanging, we force individuals in our
community to call the police back.
That goes to our organizational integrity and breaks it down. And if
the public does not have trust for the police department in order to handle
things accurately and effectively, then it breaks down not only for that
individual officer that responded, but for the entire organization, and it
jeopardizes our reputation with the public.
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And when you consider public trust and how fragile that is, it's
something that we safeguard as one of the most important things as a police
department that we can hold onto and value. . . (R.31, p. 121).
And when our officers show up on things and file to do the bare
minimum for the investigations, it leaves the public with a very sour taste
that goes directly to our credibility with the public. And if we don't have
the public trust in the police department and our ability to do business, then
we really are unable to accomplish anything, and it undermines our ability
to testify in court, to testify in proceedings such as this as to facts and
everything else. (R.31, p. 138).
The CSC had before it sufficient evidence from which to conclude that the
second Harmon factor had been met.
3. Harmon factor (c): whether the offense undermines the morale and
effectiveness of the department
Officer Boston again concludes that there was no evidence that her alleged
policy violations negatively affected the Department's morale and effectiveness.
Chief Burbank testified that allowing an officer to function at less than the
standards of the SLCPD could certainly affect morale. (R.31, p. 145). He also
stated that "it also undermines the effectiveness of the administration if we don't
take appropriate action to deal with employees that are committing pretty blatant
violations of our policy and procedure, as well as undermining public trust. I
mean, that's something that officers hold in high regard." (R.31, p. 145). As a
result of Officer Boston's conduct during the theft incident, it was necessary for
another police officer to respond and, according to Chief Burbank, "clean up the
mess" Officer Boston had made. (R.31, p. 117). That officer felt compelled to
bring the situation to the attention of the sergeant. (R.31, p. 117).
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One of Officer Boston's own witnesses, Sergeant Mike Hill, testified that
he had to try to work out some morale issues with his squad and was trying to help
Officer Boston through those issues as well. (R.31, p. 233). Sgt. Hill testified that
Officer Boston "took shortcuts" and that he told her "[y]ou just can't take the
shortcut. I mean, when you do all these good things, but then you take a shortcut
and it kind of puts a kibosh on some of the good things that you're doing here."
(R.31, p. 236).
There was sufficient evidence to support the CSC's conclusion that "the
nature of the policy violations undermined the morale and effectiveness of the
Department. (R. 34, ^f 6). This satisfies factor (c) set forth in Harmon.
4. Harmon factor (d): whether the offense was committed willfully or
knowingly, rather than negligently or inadvertently.
Although the Commission found that Boston did not willfully violate
Department policy R. 34, <[} 14), there was substantial evidence presented that she
had knowledge of the policies and had received discipline in the past for violating
the same policies. (R. 31, p. 304). Officer Boston had "developed a consistent
pattern of neglect of duty, not servicing the public." (R. 31, p. 129). Chief
Burbank characterized her conduct as: "In one case she says, CI understand that I
generate a report on every single thing, almost to an extreme. And I will always
contact the supervisor.' But none of that seemed to take effect. So it's a repeated
offense over and over again. (R. 31, pp.l29-130)(Emphasis added). Also, Officer
Boston had been warned on two prior occasions that future violations of
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Department policy could result in her termination. (R. 17, p. 371: R. 18, p. 672; R.
31, p. 26).
There was sufficient evidence that Officer Boston knowingly violated the
same policies she had violated in the past, thus satisfying factor (d) set forth in
Harmon.
5. Additional considerations: whether the misconduct is likely to
reoccur.
In his letter of termination, Chief Burbank stated: 'These two new
sustained complaints are significant in their own right but, when coupled with
your complaint history, they reflect a pattern of continued inability to perform the
basic functions of a police officer. I am convinced that this trend will only
continue and I have lost all trust and confidence in your ability \o meet the many
demands that are placed on a police officer." (R. 4)(Emphasis added). He also
testified that "there's no question in my mind that she had been afforded ample
opportunity to change her behavior and did not do so." (R. 31, p. 144).
This Court should uphold the CSC's decision because it was both
reasonable and rational for the CSC to determine that termination was the
appropriate sanction in Officer Boston's case.
C.

The Discipline Was Consistent
Officer Boston challenges as being "clearly erroneous" the CSC's finding

that "Officer Boston offered no evidence of disparate treatment." (R. 33, ^| 3).
Officer Boston asserts that she had, in fact, made a prima facie case of disparate
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treatment. It appears that Officer Boston misapprehends the burden of proof she
had to shoulder at the CSC hearing.
It is well recognized that burden is "on [Boston] to establish a prima facie
case that the Chief acted inconsistently in imposing sanctions by presenting
sufficient evidence from which the Commission could reasonably find a relevant
inconsistency." Kelly, 8 P.3d at 1056. It is the burden of the disciplined employee
to point to "specific instances or statistics, rather than relying on an unsupported
assertion of inconsistent punishments " Id. (Emphasis added). A showing must be
made of "some meaningful disparity of treatment between herself and other
similarly situated employees." Id. This Court has instructed that "[mjeaningful
disparate treatment can only be found when similar factual circumstances led to a
different result without explanation" Id. (Emphasis added). Contrary to Officer
Boston's assertions, it is not the Department's burden of persuasion to prove the
"nonexistence of a disparity." Id. (Emphasis added). At all times, the burden
remained with Officer Boston.
Officer Boston challenges the CSC's finding that "Police Chief Chris
Burbank testified of several other similarly situated officers who were treated in a
similar manner to Boston." (R. 33, ^j 4). Again, rather than challenging the
finding of fact by marshalling all of the evidence in support of that fact, Officer
Boston simply states that the Department "identified no documentation," choosing
to rely instead on Chief Burbank's testimony as the "only evidence." (Boston
Brief, p. 29). Interestingly, Officer Boston, who bears the burden of proving
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disparate treatment, likewise offered no documentation, choosing not to produce
.

.

.

7

any records she obtained through discovery on prior Department discipline.
Instead, she relied on her own "opinion" that she had been treated differently. (R.
31, p. 292).
Officer Boston believes that her "opinion" that she was treated differently
is, in itself, enough to make a prima facie case of disparate treatment. However,
much more is needed in order for her to meet her burden of proof. The evidence
that the CSC had before it includes:
a.

Chief Burbank testified of a sergeant who received a $20.00 bill that

was found property but did not place that $20.00 into evidence. That sergeant
really had no other complaints in his history. (R. 31, p. 146).
b.

An officer who had been with the Department for 16 years had a

"similar story of circumstances where he was not documenting his police actions."
(R.31, p. 147). Although he did "some outstanding work" and the Chief "really
hated to lose" him, "when it came down to it, he did not document accurately
domestic violence incidents, didn't file the proper paperwork associated with that,
and he really put the public at risk." (R.31, p. 147).

7

Officer Boston refers to documents SLC 954-1126 that she received in
discovery. Of those documents, SLC 987 - 1126 were NOT admitted as exhibits
nor were they presented to the Commission. Officer Boston's attorney specifically
stated that he was "not trying to put them before the Commission" and that they
were "not intending to admit them." (R. 31, pp. 293-294). Officer Boston's
attempts to draw inferences from or otherwise use those documents now for the
first time on appeal should be rejected.
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c.

Chief Burbank made the decision to terminate both of the above

individuals but both resigned in lieu of termination. (R.31, pp. 147-148).
d.

Chief Burbank testified of a sergeant who, on a DUI call, chose to

destroy evidence and not process the person for DUI. (R.31, p. 148). The
sergeant had no prior disciplinary history but Chief Burbank imposed a 60-hour
suspension without pay for this first sustained misconduct. (R.31, pp. 149-150).
Another complaint came in against this sergeant in close proximity and Chief
Burbank placed him on administrative leave. (R.31, p. 150). The sergeant
resigned while that investigation was pending. (R.31, p. 150).
e.

Commissioner Quintana asked Chief Burbank: "So you've lost

some fairly good officers and some outstanding officers to misconduct?" To
which Chief Burbank responded, "Yeah. And it's unfortunate. But I think for,
again, the departmental integrity that it's essential." (R.31, p. 149).
Officer Boston made no effort to marshal the facts in support of
consistency. Rather, in her Brief, she makes conclusory statements that fail to
even reflect the totality of her own testimony. For instance: Officer Boston points
to one officer who had improperly handled a DUI investigation, concluding that he
"had been disciplined with 60 hours of unpaid suspension and ordered to take
additional DUI training." (Boston Brief, p. 26). She ignores Chief Burbank's
testimony about this incident (supra), including the fact that this individual had no
prior disciplinary history when he was given the 60-hour suspension, a fact she
admitted at the hearing but did not mention in her Brief. (R. 31, p. 302). Officer
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Boston also fails to point this Court to her admission during the CSC hearing that
the person who received the 60-hour suspension had no formal disciplinary history
prior to his suspension whereas Officer Boston had a written reprimand, a 40-hour
suspension and an 80-hour suspension prior to being terminated for misconduct.
(R.31, pp. 301-302).
In her Brief, Officer Boston also points to "T.S" who was employed by the
Department for a period of time similar to Officer Boston. Although Officer
Boston never mentioned this case during the CSC hearing and her counsel never
questioned Chief Burbank about it, she nevertheless points to this matter as one
that established her prima facie case. She indicates that T.S. had received six
warnings for various policy violations prior to being terminated for inappropriate
use of communication systems and sexual harassment. (Boston Brief, p. 28).
Officer Boston concludes that T.S. had a "substantial prior history of perfomiance
deficits" but, once again, is completely silent as to her own substantial prior
history of perfomiance deficits that was presented to the CSC and which Chief
Burbank testified that he could not ignore. (Boston Brief, p. 28; R.31, p. 141).
She also fails to point out that it was Chief Dinse, not Chief Burbank, who made
the decision to terminate T.S's employment.
She also points to Officer Greer who was terminated for three incidents of
misconduct. Her only effort to distinguish this case from hers is to cite to this
Court's unpublished opinion, Greer v Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm 7z, 2007
UT App 293, 2007 WL 2566280, and offer the conclusion that Officer Greer was
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terminated for "overtly improper and hostile conduct" whereas Officer Boston's
"errors were of omission, not affirmative misconduct." (Boston Brief, p. 28).
Such a characterization completely ignores all of the evidence the CSC received
concerning Officer Boston's behavior in both the collision/DUI incident and the
theft incident.
Officer Boston apparently believes that Chief Burbank's testimony about
other officers he has disciplined constitutes mere "generalities" when compared to
o

Officer Boston's "assessment of several cases." (Boston Brief, p. 31).

Such a

statement is entirely contrary to the well-established law that the "Chief must have
the ability to manage and direct his officers, and is in the best position to know
whether their actions merit discipline. " Kelly, 8 p. 3d at 1054, (emphasis added).
Moreover, the argument fails to recognize that the CSC "is required to give
deference to the Chief, as he is able to 'balance the competing concerns in
pursuing a particular disciplinary action.'" Harmon, 171 P.3d at 476. Officer
Boston's attacks on the CSC's finding of fact that "Officer Boston offered no
evidence of disparate treatment" (R. 33, ^f 3) should be rejected because she has
failed (1) to sustain her burden of marshaling the evidence, (2) to carry her burden
of showing some meaningful disparity of treatment between herself and other
Department employees, and (3) to establish a prima facie showing that Chief

It should be noted that Officer Boston's counsel never cross-examined Chief
Burbank about his discipline of any other officer nor did he question Chief
Burbank about any perceived "generalities.
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Burbank's actions were contrary to his prior practice. (See, e.g. Kelly, 8 p. 3d at
1055).
CONCLUSION
Chief Burbank properly determined that termination was the appropriate
discipline to impose based upon Officer Boston's misconduct. The CSC reviewed
all of the evidence, reached factual findings based upon the evidence presented to
it and properly concluded that Chief Burbank's decision was appropriate. Officer
Boston has failed to demonstrate Chief Burbank's decision was factually or legally
incorrect. This Court should determine, as it did in Kelly, that the "Commission
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Chiefs decision to terminate
[Boston] was proportionate to the offense when viewed in light of her entire
record with the Department, specifically recognizing that the chief had given her
many opportunities to correct her behavior and had engaged in progressive
discipline." Kelly, 8 p.3d at 1057.
The City respectfully submits that this Court should affirm the CSC's
ruling upholding the Chiefs decision to terminate Officer Boston.
Dated this 24th day of September, 2008.

IARTHA
Senior City Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
Salt Lake City Corporation
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